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June 2011 there exists an eﬃcient algorithm that can verify whether a given data set on observed
choices from a collection of choice sets is consistent with the choices from a coalition
of individuals that selects only Pareto optimal alternatives? In general we  nd that
Pareto optimal choice behavior has either no testable restrictions or that its testable
implications are very diﬃcult to verify. For the latter case, this is established by show-
ing that the problem is RT-complete. Our  ndings bear important empirical impli-
cations. e fact that the veri cation of Pareto consistent choice behavior is either
trivial or RT-complete demonstrates that empirical refutation or acceptance of Pareto
optimal choice behavior might be extremely diﬃcult. In fact, all known algorithms
to solve RT-complete problems suﬀer from exponential worst time complexity.
Consider an individual who selects from every set in a collection of choice sets one
or several alternatives. ese choices are rationalizable if it is possible to endow this
individualwithanicelybehaved(i.e. transitiveandcomplete)preferencerelationover
the set of alternatives such that for every choice set, the set of chosen alternatives co-
incides with the set of all maximal elements according to this preference relation. In
this single person setting rationalizability is easily veri ed. In a seminal contribution
to the literature Richter (1966) demonstrates that a choice function is ‘individually’
rationalizable if it satis es the congruence condition. is condition requires that
the transitive part of the revealed preference relation does not con ict with the strict
revealed preference relation. e congruence condition can be tested in three steps.
First, one constructs the revealed preference relation from the observed choice behav-
ior. In particular, an alternative is revealed preferred to a second one if the  rst was
chosen while the second was feasible. Next, one constructs the transitive closure of
this revealed preference relation, using for example Warshall (1962)’s algorithm. Fi-
nally, it is veri ed that this transitive closure does not contradict the strict revealed
preference relation. An alternative is strictly revealed preferred to a second alternative
if it was chosen while the second alternative was feasible but not retained.
Nowconsiderasettingwheremultipleindividualsinacoalitionjointlychooseone
or several alternatives from every set in a collection of choice sets. It is well known
that in a multi-person setting the observed choices do not always coincide with the
set of maximal elements from a single preference relation. Even if all individuals are
endowed with a transitive and complete preference relation their joint behavior is not
necessarily consistent with the rational choice of a single representative individual.
Moreover, the outcome of the joint decision will largely depend on the speci c un-
derlying decision process. One of the most straightforward extension of individual
rationality to a multi-person setting is rendered by the notion of Pareto optimality.
Paretooptimalityrequiresthatifanalternativeischosenthenthereisnootherfeasible
2alternative that was preferred to this chosen alternative by all individuals.1
e principle of Pareto optimality is one of the cornerstones of normative eco-
nomic analysis and it is beyond any doubt the most frequently used concept in wel-
fare economics and cooperative game theory. Apart from this normative perspective
Pareto optimality is also frequently used to explain actual cooperative behavior (e.g.
models of household behavior,  rm-union wage negotiations, job-matching and job-
search models, international trade negotiation models and models cartel formation
in oligopolistic competition). Nevertheless, despite its wide prevalence as a norma-
tive and behavioral principle there are relatively few researches that look at its testable
implications.
In this research we look at the computational complexity of verifying whether a
given choice function is consistent with Pareto eﬃcient choice behavior from a coali-
tion of individuals. Towards this end we distinguish between two situations. For the
 rst situation we say that a choice function is Pareto rationalizable if there exist pref-
erence relations, one for each member in the coalition, such that the observed choices
from a choice set coincide with the entire set of Pareto optimal alternatives from this
set. e second situation, which is called weak Pareto rationalizability, only requires
that there exist preference relations such that the observed choices are Pareto optimal.
In other words, weak Pareto rationalizability does not require that the choice function
selects the entire set of Pareto optimal alternatives.
As stated above, Pareto rationalizability requires the chosen alternatives from a choice
setcoincidewithsetallParetooptimalalternativesfromthisset. Sprumont(2000)in-
vestigatestheproblemofParetorationalizabilityinthesettingofanormalformgame.
In this setting, Sprumont obtained a characterization of Pareto rationalizability for
coalitions of size two. Furthermore, he showed that in in this case, Pareto rationaliz-
ability is empirically indistinguishable from rationalizability with the noncooperative
Nashconcept. More recently, Echenique and Ivanov (2011) investigatedPareto ratio-
nalizability in a general choice theoretic setting. ey obtained two characterizations
for a choice function to be Pareto rationalizable by a two person coalition. e  rst
characterization reduces the problem of rationalizability to a graph coloring problem.
e second characterization obtains an equivalence in terms of the feasibility of a sys-
tem of quadratic equations. Other relevant researches impose more structure on the
underlying framework. For example, Bossert and Sprumont (2002) characterize con-
sistency of a choice function with Pareto eﬃciency (and individual rationality) in the
setting of a two person exchange economy.
1In this paper, we take a preference relation to be asymmetric, transitive and complete. As such, an
alternative is Pareto optimal if it is not unanimously dominated by another feasible alternative.
3In section 3, we derive the computational complexity of Pareto rationalizability
using a general choice theoretic setting. We proceed in three steps. First we show
that Pareto rationalizability is RT-complete for all coalitions with at least three indi-
viduals. Second, we show that if the coalition has two individuals and if the choice
domain is binary (i.e. if the collection of choice sets contains all two element subsets
of the universal set of alternatives) then the problem of Pareto rationalizability can be
eﬃciently veri ed. ird, we prove that for coalitions of size two and for non-binary
choice domains, the problem of Pareto rationalizability is again RT-complete.
In many settings the choices from a coalition do not coincide with the entire set of
Pareto optimal allocations. For example, if the coalition chooses by means of a bar-
gaining model (e.g. Nash bargaining or Raiﬀa-Kalai-Smorodinsky) then the observed
outcome will be Pareto optimal but the chosen alternative(s) will not necessarily co-
incide with the entire set of Pareto optimal outcomes. In this perspective, we say that
a choice function is weakly Pareto rationalizable if there exist individual preference
relations such that the chosen elements are a subset of the set of Pareto eﬃcient al-
ternatives. To our knowledge this is the  rst research that looks at this property in a
general choice theoretic setting.2
In section 4 we show that, in general, the notion of weak Pareto rationalizability
has no testable constraints on observed choice behavior. In fact, it is quite trivial
to show that any choice function is weak Pareto rationalizable by a coalition with
two individuals (see Proposition 1). Although this result is probably well known3 it
nevertheless emphasizes that from an empirical viewpoint Pareto optimality is a very
weak concept. In order to restore empirical refutability we introduce the concept
of a dominance relation. Simply said, a dominance relation is a known subrelation
of the Pareto dominance relation: if an alternative a is better than the alternative
b according to the dominance relation we know that all individuals in the coalition
prefer a over b. We provide several settings where such dominance relation appears
naturally. Further, we show that the inclusion of a dominance can lead to non-trivial
restrictions on observed choice behavior.4 Next, we demonstrate that the inclusion
2However, there has been a growing stream of research that looks at the testable implications of
(weak) Pareto rationalizability in a household consumption setting with private and public goods (see,
for example, Apps and Rees (1988); Chiappori (1988, 1992) and Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen
(2007).
3In fact, this result and its proof is very similar to the result of Sprumont (2000, Proposition 1)
who showed that weak Pareto rationalizability has no testable implications in the setting of a normal
form game.
4A trivial restriction would be, for example, that a cannot be chosen from {a;b} when b is better
than a according to the dominance relation.
4of such dominance relation implies that the problem of weak Pareto rationalizability
becomes RT-complete for all coalitions with at least two individuals.
By establishing the computational complexity of rationalizing Pareto eﬃcient choice
behaviorwecontributetothesmallbutgrowingliteraturethatestablishesRT-completeness
results for various economic problems.5 Particularly relevant to our results is the line
of research within this literature that looks at the computational complexity of var-
ious (individual or collective) rationalizability problems. Galambos (2009) employs
the setting of Sprumont (2000) and shows that the problem of rationalizing a choice
function as the outcome of a noncooperative Nash equilibrium in a normal form
game is an RT-complete problem. Next, Apesteguia and Ballester (2010) consider the
model of choice by multiple rationales from Kalai, Rubinstein, and Spiegler (2002)
and demonstrates that computing the minimal number of rationales that rationalizes
a given choice function is an RT-complete problem. Demuynck (forthcoming) estab-
lishes similar RT-completeness results for the sequential choice model of Manzini and
Mariotti(2007)andthemodelofchoicebygametreesfromXuandZhou(2007). Fi-
nally, Talla Nobibon and Spieksma (2010)  nd that verifying the revealed preference
conditions of Pareto optimal choice behavior for a two person coalition as derived by
Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2007) is an RT-complete problem. is setting
diﬀers from ours in the sense that these conditions are obtained from a revealed pref-
erence analysis a là Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982) (i.e. in a household consumption
setting). On the other hand, our paper focusses on the more general, choice theoretic
setting.
Section 2 provides a short introduction in to the theory of computational complexity.
e readers who are familiar with this theory may safely skip this section. Section
3 introduces the main notation and establishes the computational complexity results
for Pareto rationalizability. Section 4 provides computational complexity results for
weak Pareto rationalizability.
5See, among many others, Gilboa and Zemel (1989); Papadimitriou (1992); Koller and Megiddo
(1992); Faigle and Kern (1997); Faigle, Kern, and Kuipers (1998); Chu and Halpern (2001); Fang,
Zhu, Cai, and Deng (2002); Woeginger (2003); Baron, Durieu, Haller, and Solal (2004); Ballester
(2004); Aragones, Gilboa, Postlewaite, and Schmeidler (2005); Baron, Durieu, Haller, Savani, and
Solal (2008); Brandt and Fisher (2008); Conitzer and Sandholm (2008); Hudry (2009); Mannor and
Tsitsiklis (2009); Brandt, Fisher, Harrenstein, and Mair (2010); Gilboa, Postlewaite, and Schmeidler
(2010)
52 RT-completeness
is section provides a short introduction to the theory of computational complexity.
For the readers who are familiar with the notion of RT-completeness this section may
be skipped. For compactness, we only provide a very quick introduction alas at the
cost of accuracy. For a detailed introduction into the theory of computational com-
plexity and RT-completeness in particular we refer to the seminal work of Garey and
Johnson (1979).
e theory of computational complexity attempts to answer how much time (and
memory) is needed to solve a decision problem. A decision problem is composed of
a collection of instances which are the input to the problem and a Yes/No question.
e collection of instances I give the inputs of the decision problem. Normally,
it is assumed that these instances are encoded in some convenient way. is is done
by using a suitable set of symbols Σ (e.g. Σ = {0,1}) and by de ning I as a subset
of all  nite strings of symbols from Σ, i.e. I ⊆
∪∞
n=1 Σn. For a particular instance
I ∈ I we call the smallest n such that I ∈ Σn the length or size of I. In general,
the particular encoding of the instances are not really important and does not really
change the results. erefore, one mostly abstains from specifying this encoding.
e Yes/No question of a decision problem corresponds to each instance I ∈ I a
Yes or a No depending on whether the particular instance I satis es a certain property.
Formally, one could think of the Yes/No question as a function f from the set of
all instances I to the binary set {0,1}. en, we say that an instance satis es the
particular property or is a Yes instance if f(I) = 1, and it does not satisfy the property
and is a No instance when f(I) = 0.
e theory of computational complexity divides decision problems according to the
time it takes to compute the value of f(I) given the instance I. Here, time is expressed
with respect to the size of the instance. e two most important classes of decision
problems are the classes T and RT. e class T (polynomial) contains all decision
problems which are easy to solve. ese problems can be solved using an algorithms
that computes the solution in a polynomial number of steps in terms of the size of
the instance. e class RT (nondeterministic polynomial) contains all problems that
might be diﬃcult to solve (i.e. it might take exponential time) but which are easy to
verify. In particular, any solution to the problem can be veri ed in polynomial time.6
6e exact way by which this is de ned is that there exists a polynomial time algorithm (function)
g and for each instance I for which f(I) = 1, there exists a certi cate C(I) of polynomial size such that
g(C(I);I) = 1 and for all instances I for which f(I) = 0 and all certi cates C it is always the case that
g(C;I) = 0.
6Of course, any decision problem in the class T is also in RT. At present, it is
not known if the converse also holds. e general accepted belief is that T̸= RT. A
decision problem which is as diﬃcult to solve as any problem in the class RT is called
RT-hard. A decision problem is RT-complete if it is both RT-hard and in RT. RT-
complete problems are among the most diﬃcult problems in the class RT. ey are
considered to be computationally intractable especially for large instances. In fact, all
knownsolutionmethodsapplicabletoRT-completeproblemssuﬀerfromexponential
worst-time complexity.
In order to understand the proofs in the following sections, it might be interesting to
haveaquickoverviewofhowRT-completenessresultsareestablished. Inprinciple,for
a candidate decision problem to be RT-complete it suﬃces to demonstrate two things.
First, one must demonstrate that the problem is in the class RT. In other words, it
must be show that given a proposed polynomial sized solution to the problem it can
be eﬃciently veri ed (i.e. in polynomial time) that this proposed solution is indeed
a solution. Second, it must be shown that the RT-completeness result is at least as
hard as any other problem in RT (i.e. the problem is RT-hard). e way by which
this is established is by taking a known RT-complete problem and showing that this
problem is a special case of the candidate problem. As such, the candidate problem
will be at least as diﬃcult as the RT-complete problem. is demonstrates that the
candidateproblemisalsoRT-hard. Usually,thissecondstepisprovedbythetechnique
of polynomial reduction. Let the known RT-complete problem be represented by a
collection of instances I and the function f : I → {0,1} and let the candidate
problem be represented by the collection of instances I′ and the function g : I′ →
{0,1}. In order to show that (g,I′) is RT-hard it suﬃces to demonstrate that there
exists a function γ from I to I′ such that (i) γ is computable in polynomial time and
(ii) an instance I ∈ I of the RT-complete problem provides a solution to this problem
(i.e. f(I) = 1) if and only if the instance γ(I) provides a solution to the candidate
problem (i.e. g(γ(I)) = 1). e idea behind this construction is that any algorithm
that eﬃciently computes the function g can also be used to eﬃciently compute the
function f by means of the intermediate function γ (i.e. in order to know the value
of f(I) it is always possible to compute g(γ(I))). In this sense, the problem (f,I) is at
least as easy to solve as the problem (g,I′).
3 Pareto rationalizability
In this section we establish the computational complexity of Pareto rationalizability.
In doing so we also introduce the necessary notation and de nitions for section 4.
7Consider a  nite set of alternatives X and a  nite collection D of nonempty subsets
of X. We call D the domain of the decision problem. e domain D is binary if it
includes all two element subsets from X, i.e. for all a,b ∈ X, {a,b} ∈ D. A choice
function c corresponds to each choice set A from D a nonempty set c(A) ⊆ A.
A binary relation ≻ on X is transitive if for all a,b and c ∈ X, a ≻ b and b ≻ c
implies a ≻ c. e relation is complete or total if for every two distinct elements a
and b ∈ X either a ≻ b or b ≻ a. e relation ≻ is asymmetric if for all distinct a
and b ∈ X not (a ≻ b and b ≻ a). A partial order is a transitive and asymmetric
relation. Alinearorderorpreferencerelationisatransitive, asymmetricandcomplete
relation.
Given a relation ≻ on X and a subset A from X we denote by M(≻,A) the set of
maximal elements of A according to the relation ≻. Formally,
M(≻,A) = {a ∈ A|∀b ∈ A,b ̸≻ a}.
For a strict positive number K ∈ N and a pro le (list) of preference relations
{≻k}k≤K wesaythat≻istheParetodominancerelationof{≻k}k≤K ifforalla,b ∈ X,
a ≻ b if and only if a ≻k b for all k ≤ K.






ber K and a pro le {≻k}k≤K for which ≻ is the corresponding Pareto dominance re-
lation. As such, any partial order is the Pareto dominance relation for some coalition.
ey de ned the dimension of a partial order as the smallest number of linear orders
whose Pareto dominance relation coincides with this partial order. Formally, a partial
order ≻ has dimension less or equal than K if there exists a pro le {≻k}k≤K of K
preference relations such that ≻ is the corresponding Pareto dominance relation. In
the same article, Dushnik and Miller also provide two characterizations for a partial
order to have a dimension smaller than or equal to 2.7
Let us now return to the problem of Pareto rationalizability. We de ne a choice func-
tion to be Pareto rationalized by a given pro le of preference relations if the choices
from each choice set coincide with the set of all Pareto eﬃcient alternatives from this
pro le.
7See also Sprumont (2001) for a diﬀerent but simpler characterization for a partial order to be of
dimension 2, provided some regularity conditions are satis ed.
8De nition 1 (Pareto rationalizability). A choice function c is Pareto rationalized by the
pro le of preference relations {≻k}k≤K iﬀ for all A ∈ D,
c(A) = M(≻,A),
where ≻ is the Pareto dominance relation of {≻k}k≤K.
Given this, we can de ne the following decision problem.
K-Pareto rationalizability (K-PRat): Given a  nite universal set X, a domain D and
a choice function c, does there exist a pro le of K preference relations {≻k}k≤K that Pareto
rationalizes the choice function c?
In terms of the formulation in the previous section, we have that each instance I
of the decision problem K-PRat is determined by a triple (X,D,c) which contains a
set of alternatives, a domain and a choice function on this domain. e function f
that determines the decision problem K-PRat maps an instance (X,D,c) to 1 if and
only if it is Pareto rationalizable by a pro le of K preference relations. Notice that the
size of the coalition K is a parameter of the decision problem K-PRat. As such, we
actually obtain an in nite number of decision problems, one for each value of K ∈ N.
is setting is more restrictive than when we would take the number of individuals
in the coalition K as an additional argument of the instance. For example, we could
de ne the following problem, PRat.
Paretorationalizability(PRat): GivenauniversalsetX, adomainD, achoicefunction
c and a number K, does there exist a pro le of K preference relations {≻k}k≤K that Pareto
rationalizes the choice function c?
ObservethattheinstancesoftheproblemPRatconsistsofquadruples(X,D,c,K).
Hence, in this case, the number of individuals K in the coalition is a part of the input
to the problem. e problem PRat is RT-complete as soon as there exists at least one
value of K for which K-PRat is RT-complete. However, the converse does not neces-
sarily hold, i.e. it is possible that PRat is RT-complete while K-PRat is in T for some
value of K. For example, this is the case when K = 1.
We derive the computational complexity of K-PRat (for K ≥ 2) in several steps. Let
us  rst focus on the case where the size of the coalition K is greater or equal to three.
Consider the decision problem of establishing the dimension of a partial order.
K-dimension (K-Dim): Given a partial order ≻, is this relation of dimension K or less?
Yannakakis (1982) proved that the decision problem K-Dim is RT-complete for
all K ≥ 3. On the other hand, it is known that K-Dim is eﬃciently solvable, i.e. in
9theclassT, ifKislessthanorequaltotwo. WerefertoSpinrad(1994)foranoverview
of the diﬀerent algorithms that can be applied in this case. We state this result in the
next theorem.
eorem 1. e problem K-Dim is RT-complete for all K ≥ 3. On the other hand,
K-Dim is in T if K ≤ 2.
Using the result of Yannakakis (1982) we can show that K-PRat is RT-complete
for all K ≥ 3. e proof uses a reduction from the RT-compete problem K-Dim.
Given the partial order ≻, we construct an instance (X,D,c) for which the Pareto
dominance relations coincides with ≻. For this, it suﬃces to consider the instance
where the domain D coincides with all two element subsets from X. en, if a ≻ b
wedetermine c({a,b}) = {a} andif a ̸≻ b and b ̸≻ a weset c({a,b}) = {a,b}. As
such, we have that the partial relation ≻ has dimension less than or equal to K if and
only if the corresponding instance (X,D,c) is rationalizable by a pro le of no more
than K preference relations. is shows that K-PRat is at least as diﬃcult to solve as
K-Dim. e RT-completeness of K-PRat for K ≥ 3 then follows immediately from
the RT-completeness of K-Dim for K ≥ 3.
When K = 2, this construction can no longer be used to prove RT-completeness
because we have that 2-Dim is eﬃciently solvable. However, as long as the domain
is binary we can use a similar construction and use the eﬃciency of 2-Dim to show
that 2-PRat is also eﬃciently solvable. In order to do this, we devise an algorithm that
veri es 2-PRat in three steps. First one constructs the partial order ≻ such that a ≻ b
if and only if a = c({a,b}). is relation is well de ned because the domain D is
binary. In a second step, it is veri ed whether ≻ is of dimension less than or equal
to 2. Finally, it is veri ed that for all A ∈ D, c(A) = M(≻,A). It is easy to see that
an instance satis es 2-PRat if and only if it passes this algorithm. Also, all three steps
in this algorithm can be veri ed in polynomial time. erefore, 2-PRat is in T for all
instances with a binary domain.
Finally, we need to consider the case with K = 2 and where the domain is not binary.
In this setting we can no longer make use of the problem K-Dim. Surprisingly, we
 nd that for non-binary domains 2-PRat is also RT-complete. e proof relies on a
reduction from the RT-complete problem 3-SAT. e following theorem summarizes
the results from this section.
eorem 2. e decision problem K-PRat is RT-complete for all K ≥ 2. If we restrict the
domain to be binary, then 2-PRat is in T.
10Proof. e proof that K-PRat is RT-complete for all K ≥ 3 and that 2-PRat is in T
when the domain is binary was given in the main text above. As such, we focus on
showing that 2-PRat is RT-complete.
Membership in RT is easily veri ed. For the second step of the proof we use a reduc-
tion from the problem 3-SAT. An instance of 3-SAT consists of a  nite set of binary
variables v1,...,vn and a  nite set of clauses C1,...,Cm. Each clause contains three
literals and each literal is either equal to a variable vi (i = 1,...,n) or its negation
1 − vi (i = 1,...,n). e following de nes the decision problem 3-SAT.
3-Satis ability (3-SAT): Given a  nite set of variables v1,...,vn and a  nite set of
clauses C1,...,Cm, does there exist an assignment to the variables, either 1 or 0, such that
each clause contains at least one literal with the value 1.
Let v1,...,vn be a list of variables and let C1,...,Cm be a list of clauses corre-
sponding to an instance of 3-SAT. From these, we construct an instance of 2-PRat: a
set of alternatives X, a domain D and a choice function c. We begin by de ning the
set X.
• We construct two alternatives a and b.
• For each clause Cℓ (ℓ = 1,...,m) we construct an alternative dℓ.
• For each variable vi (i = 1,...,n) we construct four alternatives yi, yi,wi and
 wi.
For each clause Cℓ and each literal lk,ℓ (k = 1,2,3; ℓ = 1,...,m) from this clause
we consider the alternatives zk,ℓ and  zk,ℓ in X such that if lk,ℓ = vi then zk,ℓ = yi and
 zk,ℓ =  yi, and if lk,ℓ = (1 − vi) then zk,ℓ = wi and  zk,ℓ =  wi. e construction of the
domainD andthevalueofthechoicefunctioncisgiveninTable1. isconstruction
can be performed in polynomial time.
Webeginbyshowingthatwhenthisinstancesatis es2-PRatthenthecorrespond-
ing 3-SAT problem has a solution. Consider a rationalization {≻1,≻2} of the in-
stance (X,D,c). First, consider the comparison between a and b. We can assume,
without loss of generality that a ≻1 b and b ≻2 a. Otherwise, we can exchange the
preferences ≻1 and ≻2 everywhere.
Now, considerthealternativesyi, yi,wi and  wi whosecomparisonsaredetermined
by conditions (4)-(7). One can verify that comparisons between these alternatives
must take one of two mutually exclusive con gurations. We determine the values of
the variables vi (i = 1,...,n) according to which con guration prevails. e two
con gurations are given by Figure 1 where a dashed arrow determines the relation
11Table 1: Choice sets and choice function
choice set, A choice, c(A) range
{a,b} {a,b} (1)
{dℓ,b} {dℓ} ℓ = 1,...,m (2)
{dℓ,a} {dℓ,a} ℓ = 1,...,m (3)
{yi, yi} {yi, yi} i = 1,...,n (4)
{wi,  wi} {wi,  wi} i = 1,...,n (5)
{ yi,wi} {wi} i = 1,...,n (6)
{ wi,yi} {yi} i = 1,...,n (7)
{dℓ, zk,ℓ} {dℓ} ℓ = 1,...,m;k = 1,2,3 (8)
{z1,ℓ,z2,ℓ,z3,ℓ,a} {z1,ℓ,z2,ℓ,z3,ℓ} ℓ = 1,...,m (9)
≻1 and a solid arrow the relation ≻2. From the  gure, we see that vi = 1 whenever
yi ≻1  yi (and not wi ≻1  wi) and vi = 0 when wi ≻1  wi (and not yi ≻1  yi).
Figure 1: Value of the variable vi










.  wi .
vi = 0
We see that for no variable vi (i = 1,...,n) we have that both vi = 1 and
vi = 0. Now, consider the choice set {z1,ℓ,z2,ℓ,z3,ℓ,a}, with choices {z1,ℓ,z2,ℓ,z3,ℓ}
(see condition (9)). As the instance satis es 2-PRat, we see that there must be at least
one alternative in the set {z1,ℓ,z2,ℓ,z3,ℓ} that Pareto dominates a (because, a is not
retained). Let zk,ℓ be this alternative. We will show that the literal lk,ℓ must be equal
to one.
12Figure 2: Demonstration that zk,ℓ equals one.






e reasoning is illustrated in Figure 2. First of all from dℓ ≻2 b (comparison
(2)) and b ≻2 a we see that dℓ ≻2 a. As such, a ≻1 dℓ (follows from transitivity and
(3)). en from zk,ℓ ≻1 a ≻1 dℓ ≻1  zk,ℓ we have that zk,ℓ ≻1  zk,ℓ (this follows from
transitivity and (8)). As such, if zk,ℓ = yi then yi ≻1  yi and consequently vi = 1, and
if zk,ℓ = wi then wi ≻1  wi and vi = 0. In both cases, we have that the literal lk,ℓ is
true.
Letusnowassumethat3-SATissatis ed. Weneedtoshowthattheinstanceof2-PRat
is a Yes-instance. In other words, we need to show the existence of two preferences
that provide a Pareto rationalization. We do this by constructing two acyclic relations
≻1 and ≻2 that Pareto rationalizes every choice set. ese relations can always be ex-
tendedtocomplete,transitiveandasymmetricrelations(byusing,forexample,a nite
analogue of Szpilrajn (1930)’s Lemma). Table 2 provides a  rst set of comparisons
conditional on the values of vi (i = 1,...,n). Table 3 provides a second set of com-
parisons conditional on the values of two variables vi and vj (i,j = 1,...,n;i < j). It
is an easy but cumbersome exercise to verify that these relations rationalize the choice
function. Let us now demonstrate that they are acyclic. We focus on the relation ≻1.
e proof that ≻2 is also acyclic is very similar and left to the reader.
Towards a contradiction, assume that ≻1 contains a cycle. We proceed by sequen-
tially excluding elements from this cycle.
Fact 1. For all i = 1,...,n,
• if vi = 0, then  wi is not in the cycle of ≻1.
• if vi = 1, then  yi is not in the cycle of ≻1.
13Table 2: First set of comparisons
vi = 1 vi = 0 unconditional
yi ≻1  yi  yi ≻2 yi  yi ≻1 yi yi ≻2  yi a ≻1 b b ≻2 a
 wi ≻1 wi wi ≻2  wi wi ≻1  wi  wi ≻2 wi dℓ ≻1 b dℓ ≻2 b
a ≻1 dℓ dℓ ≻2 a
yi ≻1 a yi ≻2 a a ≻1 yi yi ≻2 a yi ≻1  wi yi ≻2  wi
a ≻1 wi wi ≻2 a wi ≻1 a wi ≻2 a wi ≻1  yi wi ≻2  yi
dℓ ≻1  zk,ℓ dℓ ≻2  zk,ℓ
Proof. is follows from the observation that there is no alternative that is dominated
by  wi (for vi = 0) or  yi (for vi = 1).
Fact 2. For all i = 1,...,n,
• if vi = 0, then yi is not in the cycle of ≻1.
• if vi = 1, then wi is not in the cycle of ≻1.
Proof. e proof is by (reverse) induction on i, i.e. starting from i = n. Assume that
yn (with vn = 0) or wn (with vn = 1) is in the cycle. e next element in the cycle
is then given by  wn (if vn = 0) or  yn (if vn = 1). However, this contradicts previous
fact.
Now, assume that the fact holds for all i with i ≥ t. en let us look at the case where
i = t − 1. If vi = 0 then the alternative following yi is either  wi (according to table
2), wj with j > i and vj = 1, or yj with j > i and vj = 0 (according to table 3). All
these cases either contradict the previous fact or the induction hypothesis. is shows
that yi is not in the cycle if vi = 0.
On the other hand, if vi = 1 then the alternative following wi is either  yi (accord-
ing to table 2), wj (with j > i and vj = 1), or yj (with j > i and vi = 0) (according
to table 3). ese cases either either contradict the previous fact or the induction
hypothesis. is shows that wi is not in the cycle if vi = 1.
e proof is completed by induction.
Fact 3. For all i = 1,...,n,
• b is not in the cycle of ≻1.
14Table 3: Second set of comparisons for i < j
vi = 1 vi = 0
yi wi yi wi
vj = 1
yj
yi ≻1 yj yj ≻1 wi yj ≻1 yi wi ≻1 yj
yj ≻2 yi wi ≻2 yj yi ≻2 yj yj ≻2 wi
wj
yi ≻1 wj wi ≻1 wj yi ≻1 wj wi ≻1 wj
wj ≻2 yi wj ≻2 wi wj ≻2 yi wj ≻2 wi
vj = 0
yj
yi ≻1 yj wi ≻1 yj yi ≻1 yj wi ≻1 yj
yj ≻2 yi yj ≻2 wi yj ≻2 yi yj ≻2 wi
wj
yi ≻1 wj wj ≻1 wi wj ≻1 yi wi ≻1 wj
wj ≻2 yi wi ≻2 wj yi ≻2 wj wj ≻2 wi
• If vi = 1, then  wi is not in the cycle of ≻1.
• If vi = 0, then  yi is not in the cycle of ≻1.
• dℓ (ℓ = 1,...,m) is not in the cycle of ≻1
• a is not in the cycle of ≻1.
Proof.
• e alternative b dominates no other element according to ≻1, hence it must
be a terminal node. A such, it cannot be part of a cycle.
• If vi = 1 and the the cycle contains  wi, then the next element in the cycle must
be wi. However, this contradicts Fact 2.
• If vi = 0 and the cycle contains  yi then the next element in the cycle must be
yi which contradicts Fact 2.
• Ifthecyclecontains dℓ thenthefollowingalternativeinthecyclemustbeeither
 wi or  yi (see Table 2). However, this either contradicts the previous  nding or
Fact 1.
15• If the cycle contains a then the following element in the cycle is either b, cℓ
(ℓ = 1,...,m) , wi (with vi = 1) or yi (with vi = 0). All these cases contradict
previous  ndings.
Fact 4. For all i = 1,...,n,
• if vi = 1, then yi is not in a cycle of ≻1.
• if vi = 0, then wi is not in a cycle of ≻1.
Proof. e proof is again by reverse induction on i starting with i = n. If yn with
vi = 1 or wn with vn = 0 is in a cycle of ≻1 then the next element in the cycle is
either  yn,  wn or a, neither of which can be part of the cycle given previous facts.
For the induction hypothesis, assume that the fact holds for all i > t and take the case
where i = t − 1. en if vi = 1 and yi is in the cycle then the next element in the
cycle is either  yi, a,  wi (according to table 2), yj (with vj = 1 and j > i), wj (with
vj = 0 and j > i), wj (with vj = 1), or yj (with vj = 0) (according to table 3). All
these cases are either excluded by previous facts or by the induction hypothesis.
Next assume that vi = 0 and that wi is in the cycle. en the next element in the
cycle is either  wi, a,  yi (according to table 2), wj (with vj = 0 and j > i), yj (with
vj = 1 and j > i), wj (with vj = 1), or yj (with vj = 0) (according to table 3). Again,
all these cases are either excluded by previous facts or by the induction hypothesis.
e proof is completed by induction.
We have shown that no element can be part of the cycle of ≻1. From this, it
follows that ≻1 is acyclic, which concludes the proof.
4 Weak Pareto rationalizability
As mentioned in the introduction, the notion of Pareto rationalizability is probably to
restrictive from an empirical point of view. It is diﬃcult to imagine a real life example
where a group of individual selects all Pareto optimal alternatives from a choice set.
In this section we look at a weaker notion of Pareto rationalizability where it is only
assumed that the observed choices are a subset of the set of Pareto optimal allocations.
is motivates the following de nition.
16De nition 2. e choice function c on a domain D is weakly Pareto rationalized by the
pro le of preference relations {≻k}k≤K iﬀ for all A ∈ D.
c(A) ⊆ M(≻,A),
where ≻ is the Pareto dominance relation for the pro le {≻k}k≤K.
e following result shows that every choice function is weakly Pareto rationaliz-
able for a coalition with two individuals.
Proposition 1. For any choice function c, there exist a pro le of preference relations
{≻1,≻2} that weakly Pareto rationalizes this choice function.
By replicating the preferences ≻1 and ≻2, this result extends to coalitions with
more than two individuals.
e proof of the proposition is quite trivial. Consider an arbitrary ranking of the
alternatives in X which we represent by the preference relation ≻1. Next, for all a and
b ∈ X de ne a ≻2 b if and only if b ≻1 a. e preference relation ≻2 is the inverse
relation of ≻1. It follows that the Pareto dominance relation is empty. is in turn
implies that for any choice set A ∈ D, the set of Pareto optimal elements from A is
the set A itself, M(≻,A) = A.
Despite the simplicity of this result it nevertheless demonstrates that we need to
include additional information in order to reject Pareto eﬃcient choice behavior. We
proceed by introducing the concept of a dominance relation.
De nition 3. e pro le {≻k}k≤K weakly Pareto rationalizes the choice function c with
the dominance relation ◃ if there exists a pro le of preferences {≻k}k≤K such that for all
A ∈ D,
c(A) ⊆ M(≻,A),
where ≻ is the Pareto dominance relation for the pro le {≻k}k≤K and for all a,b ∈ X,
a ◃ b implies that a ≻k b for all k ≤ K (i.e. ◃ ⊆≻).
In order to motivate the idea of a dominance relation we provide several examples
where such relation appears naturally.
Example1. ConsiderthesettingwhereXisa nitesetofpublicgoodsbundles. en,
we could impose that a◃ b if and only if a > b. If the bundle a has at least as much
of every good than the bundle b and if a ̸= b then a is considered better than b
for all individuals in the coalition. is will be the case if individual preferences are
monotone.
17Example 2. Consider a  nite set of outcomes O and let X be a  nite subset of the
power set of O. Every alternative in X consists of a  nite number of outcomes. If all
outcomes are desirable we can assume that a◃b whenever b ⊂ a, i.e. if all outcomes
in b are also contained in a and a contains some outcomes which are not in b then a
is better than b for all individuals.
Example 3. As a  nal example, consider the setting where X is a  nite set of income
distributions. e individuals in the coalition can be thought of as a group of govern-
ment representatives who must decide on the most favorable income distribution (for
example, by implementing a certain tax policy). In this setting it is logical to assume
that a◃b if the distribution a  rst order stochastically dominates the distribution b.
einclusionofadominancerelationtothede nitionofweakParetorationalizability
immediately imposes some restrictions on the joint choice behavior. For example, if
a ◃ b then it should not be the case that b ∈ c(A) while a ∈ A. If b was chosen
over a then at least one individual should prefer b over a. As such, we see that not
every choice function will be weakly Pareto rationalizable. However, above example
is a rather trivial restriction which has no bite if the domain contains only choice sets
with alternatives that are incomparable according to the dominance relation ◃.
As an example of a less trivial restriction, consider the set of alternatives X =
{a1,a2,b1,b2,d1,d2}. De ne the dominance relation ◃ by the comparisons a2◃b1,
a2◃d1,b2◃a1,b2◃d1,d2◃a1 andd2◃b1. edomainDconsistsofthesets{a1,a2},
{b1,b2} and {c1,c2}. Observe that none of the choice sets contains elements that are
comparable according to ◃. e choice function is given by c({a1,a2}) = {a1},
c({b1,b2}) = {b1} and c({d1,d2}) = {d1}. If {≻1,≻2} weakly Pareto rationalizes
this choice function it is necessary that the following three conditions are satis ed.
(a1 ≻1 b1 and a1 ≻1 d1) or (a1 ≻2 b1 and a1 ≻2 d1)
(b1 ≻1 a1 and b1 ≻1 d1) or (b1 ≻2 a1 and b1 ≻2 d1)
(d1 ≻1 b1 and d1 ≻1 a1) or (d1 ≻2 b1 and d1 ≻2 a1)
It is easy to see that these three conditions are incompatible. erefore, the choice
function is not weakly Pareto rationalizable.
e following de nes the decision problem for weak Pareto rationalizability.
K-weak Pareto rationalizability (K-WPRat): Given a set of alternatives X, a domain
D, a choice function c on D and a partial order ◃ on X, does there exist a pro le of
preference relations {≻k}k≤K such that this pro le provides a weak Pareto rationalization
of the choice function c and such that for all a,b ∈ X, a ◃ b implies that a ≻k b for all
k ≤ K?
18e following theorem shows that this problem is RT-complete. For K ≥ 3 the
proofusesareductionfromtheproblemK-Dimwhichwaspresentedanddiscussedin
section 3. e proof for K = 2 depends on a reduction from the problem Monotone
Not-al-equal 3-SAT.8
Although this theorem considers the general case where the dominance relation
◃ is some unrestricted partial ordering, the proof can easily be adjusted such that the
dominance relation coincides with a more speci c partial relation like in the examples
above.
eorem 3. e decision problem K-WPRat is RT-complete for all K ≥ 2.
Proof. First of all, notice that K-WPRat is in RT. e second part of the proof is split
in two parts. e  rst part shows RT-completeness for K ≥ 3. e second part proves
RT-completeness for K = 2.
For K ≥ 3 we use a reduction from the RT-complete problem K-Dim. Consider an
instance of K-Dim consisting of a partial order ≻ on a set X. First, we construct the
instance of K-WPRat, (X′,D,c). e set of alternatives X′ is de ned by X ∪ {c}
with c a new alternative not in X. Next, we set ◃ =≻ and we consider the domain
D = {{a,b},{a,b,c}|¬(a ≻ b) and ¬(b ≻ a)}. We de ne the choice function
by c({a,b,c}) = {a} and c({a,b}) = {b}. It is easy to see that the dimension of
≻ is equal to K if and only if the choice function is weakly Pareto rationalizable by a
pro le of K preferences. is shows that K-WPRat is RT-complete.
For K = 2, the proof uses a reduction from the RT-complete problem Monotone Not
All Equal 3-SAT (M-NAE-3SAT). An instance of M-NAE-3-SAT consists of a set of
binaryvariablesv1,...,vn anda nitelistofclausesC1,...,Cm. Eachclausecontains
three variables.
Monotone3SAT(M-3SAT): Does there exist a truth assignment to the variables (either
1 or 0) such that each clause contains at least one true literal (i.e. equal to 1) and at least
one false variable (i.e. equal to 0)?
Consider an instance of Monotone Not All Equal 3-SAT, i.e. a set of variables
v1,...,vn andasetofclausesC1,...,Cm. We rstconstructtheinstance(X,D,c,◃)
of 2-WPRat. We begin with the de nition of the set X.
• For each variable vi we construct two alternatives ai and  ai.
8Monotone-not-all-equal-3SAT can be obtained from the RT-complete problem Not-all-equal-
3SAT (Garey and Johnson, 1979) by replacing all literals of the form (1 − vi) by a variable yi and
adding an additional clause of the form {yi;vi;vi}.
19• Foreachclausecℓ,weconstruct12alternatives: z1,ℓ,z2,ℓ,z3,ℓ,t1,ℓ,t2,ℓ,t3,ℓ,v1,ℓ,v2,ℓ,v3,ℓ
and w1,ℓ,w2,ℓ,w3,ℓ.
• We construct an additional alternative d.
e domain D and the choice function is given in Table 4. is construction can
be performed in polynomial time.
Table 4: Construction of choice sets and choice function
choice sets choices range
{ai, ai} {ai} i = 1,...,n (1)
{ai,c, ai} { ai} i = 1,...,n (2)
{zk,ℓ,tk,ℓ} {zk,ℓ} ℓ = 1,...,m;k = 1,2,3 (3)
{zk,ℓ,d,tk,ℓ} {tk,ℓ} ℓ = 1,...,m;k = 1,2,3 (4)
We de ne two functions f(k,ℓ) and  f(k,ℓ) (k = 1,2,3;ℓ = 1,...,m). If the
kth variable in the ℓth clause is equal to the variable vi then we set f(k,ℓ) = ai and
 f(k,ℓ) =  ai. Further, we denote by k ⊕ 1 the number (k + 1) mod 3.
Next, we construct the dominance relation ◃ as in Table 5. e structure of the
Table 5: Construction of relation ◃
comparisons range
tk,ℓ ◃ vk,ℓ ℓ = 1,...,m;k = 1,2,3
tk,ℓ ◃ wk,ℓ ℓ = 1,...,m;k = 1,2,3
wk,ℓ ◃ zk⊕1,ℓ ℓ = 1,...,m;k = 1,2,3
vk,ℓ ◃ fk,ℓ ℓ = 1,...,m;k = 1,2,3
fk,ℓ ◃ zk,ℓ ℓ = 1,...,m;k = 1,2,3
relation ◃ is illustrated in Figure 3.
Let us  rst show that a solution to the weak Pareto rationalization problem leads
to a solution of M-NAE-3SAT. First of all, we see that the two individuals must diﬀer
ontheirpreferenceofai over  ai (from(1)and(2)). Now, if ai ≻1  ai (and  ai ≻2 ai)we
set vi = 1 and if ai ≻2  ai (and  ai ≻1 ai) we set vi = 0. Let us show that this provides
a solution to M-NAE-3SAT. First we demonstrate if f(k,ℓ) = ai and vi = 1 then
20Figure 3: Dominace relation ◃ for clause {v1,v2,v3}




























zk,ℓ ≻1 tk,ℓ. Otherwise we would have that  ai ≻2 ai ≻2 zk,ℓ ≻2 tk,ℓ ≻2 vk,ℓ ≻2  ai
which is a contradiction. Similarly, we can show that if f(k,ℓ) = ai and vi = 0 then
zk,ℓ ≻2 tk,ℓ.
Now assume, towards a contradiction, that M-NAE-3SAT is not satis able. en
there must be a clause cℓ where each variable is either zero or one. If all variables
are zero then zk,ℓ ≻1 tk,ℓ for all k = 1,2,3. is produces the cycle z1,ℓ ≻1 t1,ℓ ≻1
w1,ℓ ≻1 z2,ℓ ≻1 t2,ℓ ≻1 w2,ℓ ≻1 z3,ℓ ≻1 t3,ℓ ≻1 w3,ℓ ≻1 z1,ℓ. e case where all
literals are equal to zero gives an identical cycle for the relation ≻2. is shows that
M-NAE-3SAT has a solution.
To see the reverse, assume that M-NAE-3SAT has a solution. Let need to show
that the choice function is weakly Pareto rationalizable. If vi = 1 we set ai ≻1  ai and
 ai ≻2 ai. Else, if vi = 0 we set ai ≻2  ai and  ai ≻1 ai. If vi = 1 and f(k,ℓ) = ai
then we set zk,ℓ ≻1 tk,ℓ and tk,ℓ ≻2 zk,ℓ. Otherwise, if f(k,ℓ) = ai and vi = 0 we set
zk,ℓ ≻2 tk,ℓ and tk,ℓ ≻1 zk,ℓ. Further, we include into ≻1 and ≻2 all the comparisons
of ◃. Finally, let c be bottom ranked for both the relations ≻1 and ≻2.
Observe that these preferences rationalize the choice function. We still need to
showthattheycanbeextendedtocompleteandtransitiverelations. Forthisitsuﬃces
to show that ≻1 and ≻2 are acyclic. Here, we focus on the relation ≻1. e proof
21that ≻2 is acyclic is very similar.
Assume, on the contrary that ≻1 contains a cycle. We proceed by sequentially
excluding all elements from this cycle.
Fact 5.  ai is not in the cycle.
If it is, then the next element in the cycle can only be ai. is implies that vi = 0.
e third element in the cycle is an alternative zk,ℓ with f(k,ℓ) = ai. Finally, the
fourth element in the cycle then equals tk,ℓ. is implies that vi = 1, a contradiction.
Fact 6. vk,ℓ (k = 1,2,3;ℓ = 1,...,m) is not in the cycle.
If it is then the next element in the cycle must be  ai (with f(k,ℓ) = ai). is
contradicts the previous fact.
Fact 7. zk,ℓ (k = 1,2,3;ℓ = 1,...,m) is not in the cycle.
If it is then from the previous facts we must have that this cycle coincides with
z1,ℓ ≻1 t1,ℓ ≻1 w1,ℓ ≻1 z2,ℓ ≻1 t2,ℓ ≻1 w2,ℓ ≻1 z3,ℓ ≻1 t3,ℓ ≻1 w3,ℓ ≻1 z1,ℓ. is
implies that all literals in the clause Cℓ are true, which is a contradiction.
Observe that we can also exclude all alternatives wk,ℓ (because the next element is
zk⊕1,ℓ) and tk,ℓ (because the next element is either wk,ℓ or vk,ℓ) from the cycle. As such,
we have shown that the cycle in ≻1 contains no elements, hence, ≻1 is acyclic. is
concludes the proof.
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